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Abstract
We build on Decker et al. (2016) who show that business dynamism and entrepreneurship in
the U.S. have declined over recent decades and that the characteristics of this decline changed
around 2000. Since 2000 the U.S. decline in dynamism has been accompanied by a decline in
high-growth, young firms. Using 30 years of data from all for-profit firms incorporated in
Belgium, we now offer evidence that Belgium, a far more rigid economy than the U.S.,
experienced a similar decline in dynamism. Furthermore, the decline set in around 2000 as well.
We attribute this not only to the declining share of young firms that become high-growth firms,
but more importantly also to the declining propensity for small (not necessarily young) firms to
experience fast growth. We do not yet know what caused this decline. Since there are
remarkable similarities between Belgium and the U.S. with respect to the secular decline in
business dynamism, global trends rather than country specific changes are most likely to be at
the basis of this evolution. A possible global trend causing dynamism to decline, is the ICT
revolution that started the second half of the ’90s. We find preliminary indications that industries
with higher ICT intensity have experienced a dynamism trend change during that same period
and show a steeper dynamism decline.
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1 Introduction
Business dynamism or the fact that firms enter, exit, expand and contract, plays a key role in
our economy. Schumpeter already understood in the 1940s that creative destruction is essential
in an innovative economy. The Olley-Pakes decomposition of productivity growth showed that
between firm reallocation of resources explains a substantial part of aggregate productivity
growth. Traditional macroeconomic approaches to understand aggregate phenomena are driven
by models that are based on average variables with little attention paid to understanding the
dynamics under the hood. Yet, we know different groups of firms (young vs. old, small vs.
large, incumbents vs. entrants, ...) play a different role in our economy. There seems to be a
consensus that a small number of high-growth firms contribute disproportionately to aggregate
employment growth. Recently, Haltiwanger et al. (2016) found high-growth firms also make
a disproportionate contribution to U.S. productivity growth as resources are rapidly shifted
towards these successful firms. Bravo-Biosca (2016) links a more dynamic growth distribution
with faster productivity growth for the U.S. and a number of European countries. Young firms
are a key component for our economy as well. Criscuolo et al. (2014) show that especially young
firms play an outsized role in overall job creation in 18 studied OECD countries, but that there
is also a great heterogeneity across countries in the extent to which young firms are job creators.
In short, the underlying mechanics of business dynamism matter, but how it matters could differ
between countries.
In this paper, we build on Decker, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, & Miranda’s (2016) paper “Where
has all the skewness gone? The decline in high-growth young firms in the U.S.,” and validate
their findings for Belgium. They show that the level of business dynamism and entrepreneurship
in the U.S. have declined over recent decades and that the characteristics of that decline have
changed around 2000. The U.S. are widely acknowledged as having a flexible, innovative and
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entrepreneurial economy and are consistently ranked amongst the top countries in competitive-
ness rankings. Business dynamism in the U.S. might be declining, but at least starting from a
very high level.
The Belgian economy, on the contrary, is perceived to be significantly less dynamic and
entrepreneurial than the U.S. Belgium scores mediocre at best at these same competitiveness
rankings.1 Furthermore, the OECD puts Belgium 3rd for protection of permanent workers
against individual and collective dismissals behind Venezuela and China. The OECD puts
the U.S. at place 69 out of 72 countries on this ranking. Zimmer (2012) shows Belgium has
the highest mismatch between labour supply and labour demand in the EU-15. Belgium thus
clearly has a more rigid labour market than the U.S. This hampers reallocation between firms.
Belgium can be regarded as less dynamic in the business sense and one cannot state business
dynamism started from a high level. We show that Belgium too experienced a decline in business
dynamism and this decline set in around 2000.
Table 1: Summary of Main Differentials in the Employment Weighted Growth Rate Distribution
1988 2000 2014
All Firms
P90-P10 34.76 37.04 29.08
P90-P50 19.32 22.58 15.87
P50-P10 15.44 14.45 13.21
Manufacturing Firms
P90-P10 27.62 25.87 19.10
P90-P50 12.13 13.61 8.91
P50-P10 15.49 12.26 10.18
Services Firms
P90-P10 38.03 45.90 32.23
P90-P50 25.11 29.45 18.43
P50-P10 12.92 16.45 13.80
Note: Figures are 3y moving averages and represent the percentage points differences between given percentiles
of the employment weighted growth rate distribution. Author calculations from firm annual accounts.
1IMD’s World Competitiveness Ranking (2015, 2016, 2017): U.S. (1st, 3rd, 4th) vs. Belgium (23rd, 22nd, 23rd);
WEF’s Global Competitiveness Report (2016-2017): U.S. (3rd) vs. Belgium (17th), World Bank’s Ease of Doing
Business (2017): U.S. (8th) vs. Belgium (42nd).
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Table 1 summarises our main findings. We measure dispersion as the difference between the
90th and the 10th percentile of the employment weighted growth rate distribution of Belgian
firms.2 This P90-P10 differential initially increased slightly over 2 percentage points (pp) prior
to 2000 and then drops with 8pp post-2000. Later we will clarify the decline in dispersion, in
fact, set in before the 2000s. Post-2000, the decline in dispersion is also associated with a decline
in skewness. The skewness, or the difference between the P90-P50 differentials and the P50-P10
differential goes up prior to 2000 to come down significantly post-2000. This decline of skewness
is predominantly driven by a decline of the P90-P50 differential. Since the medium firm shows
little to no growth, this differential is highly influenced by what happens to the fastest growing
firms in our economy. Looking into the main sectors of our economy, we see an outspoken decline
of high growth activity of services firms post-2000.
The literature on firm dynamics started in the 1990s where the underlying granularity of
aggregate net job creation was studied (e.g. Boeri & Cramer 1992, Davis & Haltiwanger 1992,
Konings 1995). Although aggregate net job creation is modest, there are large underlying flows
of gross job creation and destruction, even within narrowly defined segments of the economy.
Recently, taking a microeconomic firm level perspective to obtain a better understanding of
aggregate movements has received renewed attention.3 Next to Decker et al. (2016) who study
firm dynamics based on a large dataset covering micro-data of U.S. firms between 1976 - 2011,
there is a large literature on U.S. business dynamism. De Loecker & Eeckhout (2017) take a firm
level perspective on the evolution of U.S. markups from 1950 and find, amongst others, that a
decline in job flows is driven by the rise of market power. Their analysis is limited, however, to
publicly listed firms.
2P90-P10 is the main dynamism measure used by Decker et al. (2016). In Appendix A we analyse other definitions
as well. All measures come to the same conclusion of a decline in business dynamism.
3The role of firm heterogeneity has been exploited in recent work explaining fluctuations in GDP growth (Davis et
al. 2007; Gabaix 2011; Acemoglu et al. 2012), unemployment (Moscarini & Postel-Vinay 2012, trade (Di Giovanni
et al. 2014; Bernard et al. 2014) and aggregate (export) prices (Amiti et al. 2014).
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European business dynamism only started to be documented. Recently Bravo-Biosca et al.
(2016) look at drivers of cross-country differences in firm growth dynamics and link them with
labour market regulation, bankruptcy legislation, financial market development and R&D sup-
port policies. Bravo-Biosca (2016) subsequently links a more dynamic firm growth distribution
with faster productivity growth and also shows the U.S. performs better than most European
countries for a wide set of metrics of business dynamism. Calvino et al. (2015) document cross
country differences on start-up dynamics and find that most surviving start-ups do not grow.
Andrews et al. (2015) find that some countries are more successful than others at channelling
scarce resources to productive and innovative firms and show this partly reflects cross-country
differences in the policy environment. Andrews et al. (2016) study the growing divergence be-
tween firms that operate at the frontier and “the rest”. Recently, OECD (2017b) released its
flagship report on business dynamics and productivity that discusses a wide set of topics based
on a granular study of underlying business level data. Using Belgian data, Geurts & Van Biese-
broeck (2016) have studied job creation in de novo or newly founded firms. They find that, once
the data is corrected for spurious entrants, contribution from start-ups to overall job creation is
relatively small and not very persistent.
Studies using European data, however, are generally based on the OECD’s DynEmp project
or Bureau Van Dijk’s Orbis database and only cover a time-frame of up to 10 years and/or do not
cover the full set of private enterprises. Using data only covering a limited timeframe, we would
have no possibility to disentangle a secular trend from the impact of the business cycle. Orbis
offers longer time series for some countries, but especially small firms are under represented in
this database. Since younger firms are on average smaller than mature firms, young firms are
under represented as well. We find this especially problematic to study business dynamism as
dynamism is disproportionately driven by younger firms.
The contribution of this paper is that, contrary to other studies on European data, we cover
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a 30 years time-frame for not only older and larger firms but also for all for profit enterprises
similar to Decker et al. (2016). Our analysis now confirms that the decline in business dynamism
is a secular trend spanning multiple business cycles and is not limited to economies that already
were highly dynamic. We do not yet know what caused this decline. Since there are remark-
able similarities between Belgium and the U.S. with respect to the secular decline in business
dynamism, global trends rather than country specific changes are most likely to be at the basis
of this evolution. An additional contribution of this paper is that we also find an outspoken
decline of high growth activity with mature, smaller firms whereas the biggest mature firm show
an increasing propensity to experience high growth episodes. The long term effects of this trends
are yet unclear. The decline in business dynamism and reallocation of human resources between
firms is also for Belgium a worrying evolution. Van Beveren & Vanormelingen (2014) estimate
that reallocation accounts for approximately three quarters of aggregate productivity growth in
Belgium.
This paper continues as follows. The next Section 2 explains how business dynamism can be
linked with 2 key characteristics (dispersion and skewness) of the firm growth rate distribution.
Section 3 discusses our primary data source from the National Bank of Belgium (NBB). Section
4 zooms into the decline in business dynamism measured via growth rate dispersion. Section 5
examines the skewness of this distribution and its link with high-growth firm activity. Section
6 explores ICT a cause of declining dynamism. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Characteristics of Firm Growth Rate Distributions
We follow Decker et al. (2016) and capture business dynamism (firms entering, exiting, expand-
ing and contracting) by the statistical distribution of firm employment growth rates. A high
dispersion of the distribution indicates that successful firms grow fast and unsuccessful firms
shrink fast. It can hence be regarded as a strong proxy for the level of reallocation of labour
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between firms.
It has long been known that the distribution of firm growth rates is fat-tailed resembling
a tent-shaped Laplace distribution. E.g., Bottazzi & Secchi (2006) and more recently Bravo-
Biosca (2016) confirm empirically that the distribution has indeed fat tails, but it is also roughly
symmetric. Both studies, however, are biased towards larger firms as they only include listed
companies or companies with more than 10 employees. They hence do not capture the enormous
skewness observed by Decker et al. (2014) of the growth rate distribution of younger (and
hence smaller) firms. Reichstein & Jensen (2005) also found clear evidence of skewness in the
Danish firm growth distribution, especially for the right tail, containing the fastest growing
firms. Decker et al. (2016) find substantial, though declining, skewness in the U.S. firm growth
rate distribution. A fatter right tail, especially in the growth rate distribution of young firms,
is consistent with theoretical models on firm growth. The up-or-out mechanism described by
the passive learning model of Jovanovic (1982) implies that young firms either realise they
are productive and rapidly expand or realise they are not and disappear. Another source of
skewness stems from the fact the vast majority of firms is simply static and shows near zero
growth. Most firms are not willing or not able to achieve growth as shown by Schoar (2010). She
differentiates between subsistence and transformational entrepreneurs, with the latter a small
minority of firms. Transformational entrepreneurs invest in R&D, innovate and if successful
rapidly expand. Next to modelling an economy consisting of 2 types of firms roughly similar to
the subsistence vs. transformational firms, Acemoglu et al. (2013) find in U.S. data that small
and young firms are both more R&D intensive and grow more. This is consistent with Ho¨lzl
(2009) who showed that for countries on the technological frontier (for which Belgium is used
as an example) innovation becomes increasingly important for small and medium sized firms
to grow rapidly. A skewed firm growth distribution is hence linked with the presence of young
and/or innovative, transformational firms.
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Another angle on the firm growth rate distribution is how it changes over time. Gibrat’s
law considers firm growth rates to be independently and identically distributed. This leads to
a stable shape of the firm growth distribution over time. Higson et al. (2002) already showed
this is not the case and claim macro-economic shocks are absorbed differently by firms in a
different place of the growth rate distribution. A better understanding of the changing shape of
the firm growth rate distribution, therefore, is an important factor for understanding the impact
of shocks on the overall economy.
In this paper, we measure firm growth via employment growth as follows:
DHSit =
Empit − Empit−1
Empit+Empit−1
2
The growth rate (DHS) for firm i at time t compares the absolute growth between t and t− 1
with the average employment of the two periods for firm i. This growth measure follows the
definition of Davis, Haltiwanger, & Schuh (1998) and transforms the domain of growth rates
from [−100%, +∞] to [−2, +2]. This allows to account for firm entry (+2) and exit (−2). Figure
1 shows an example of the growth rate distribution. A significant number of firms (especially
smaller firms) has indeed no or a limited number of employees and shows no growth at all. As
a consequence there is a very large weight on the zero value of the employment growth rate
distribution. We therefore use the employment weighted growth rate distribution as shown in
the right hand side graphs of Figure 1. These figures clearly show the asymmetric nature of
growth rates. By visually inspecting the growth rate distribution for 1986 (Figure 1b) with the
one for 2000 1d), we already see the skewness and dispersion initially goes up. Subsequently
comparing 2014 (Figure 1f) with 2000, we see skewness and dispersion coming down again.
[Figure 1 about here.]
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3 Firm Level Data
We have constructed a database from data made publicly available by the National Bank of
Belgium (NBB). The database contains the unconsolidated annual accounts of all for-profit
enterprises incorporated under Belgian law4 that are legally required to file their annual accounts
with the NBB.5 These annual accounts typically include the main figures of the profit and loss
statement, balance sheet as well as figures on the number of employees, sector, activity and
location. The dataset does not include data from self-employed workers that employ other
people but do not operate via an incorporated legal entity.
Data is on legal entity level and does not split figures over multiple establishments of the
same legal entity. This is different from Decker et al. (2016) who use establishment level data.
We are therefore not able to distinguish between organic growth and M&A linked growth. We
do not regard this, however, as an issue to study business dynamism. M&A is an essential
part of dynamism. I many cases a company buying an establishment of another company feels
it can improve something to the acquired establishment or itself. The acquiring company will
insert knowledge and/or capital to evolve the joint company either from a marketing perspective
or from an operational perspective. In other words, the buyer feels the acquisition can make
the joint firm more productive. This process is hence an essential part of reallocation driven
productivity gains.
We observe these firms during the 30-year period 1985-2014. From 1996 onwards the require-
ments for filing personnel information in Belgium were altered. For the period 1985-1995 we
measure employment growth based on the reported variable average number of employees during
the year, which includes own personnel as well as interim labour. After 1996, this variable is
not available anymore and for the period 1996-2014, we use the growth in the reported average
4This includes both locally and foreign owned firms incorporated in Belgium.
5Banks are not included in the dataset as they do not file standard annual accounts.
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full time equivalents (FTE) instead. FTE is arguably a better measure for the amount of labour
within a firm as part-time work has become increasingly popular over the previous 2 decades.6
To map the sector the firm is active in, we use the NACE Rev. 2, 2008 4-digit classification.
We assume the latest available classification for the whole company lifespan. For companies not
active after 2008 we map the older versions of the classification into the current version. If a
1-on-1 mapping is not possible, the biggest companies are mapped via a manual lookup and the
remainder is mapped to the 4-digit code via a closest match algorithm.
We do not clean the data as we believe what happens in the tails of the firm level dis-
tribution needs more scrutiny to better understand granular origins of aggregate movements.7
Our database consists of 91,487 firms employing 1,501,988 people in 1985 and 409,091 firms
employing 1,968,266 FTE in 2014. This covers almost the full Belgian private sector employ-
ment. It hence allows us to document a number of stylized facts characterizing Belgian business
dynamism, such as entry/exit and growth rate dispersion which is explained in the next section.
4 The Decline in Business Dynamism
We study the evolution of business dynamism by studying the differential of firm employment
growth rates between the 90th and the 10th percentile of the employment weighted growth rate
distribution. The higher the difference, the more reallocation of human resources across different
firms. Figure 2 shows the 90-10 differential for all firms (including entry and exit) as well as for
6To solve the 1996 change in definition, we calculate the 1995-1996 growth by comparing the average number of
employees (which includes interim labour) in 1995 with the total number of employees at the end of 1996 (a
reported variable) summed with the amount of interim labour in 1996 (reported separately). We annualise the
growth rate as we assume this growth is over 1,5 years as it compares an average variable with an end-of-year
variable. We come to an annualised growth rate of 0,64% for 1995-1996 aggregate employment in our dataset.
This compares with a 0,69% growth rate for aggregate Belgian employment according to the Eurostat Labour
Force Survey.
7We do, however, exclude Belgium’s largest employer, the Belgian National Railway Company, from our data as,
driven by EU regulation, it changes legal entity throughout the period. Since it represents approx. 4% of private
sector employment, its observed entry and exit has a substantial impact on the employment weighted growth
rate distribution.
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continuing firms8 only. As we focus on the long term trend, the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trend is
included9 as well as the 3-year moving average. We initially see an uptake in business dynamism
in the eighties. In the early eighties Belgium was regarded as the sick man of Europe: (very)
high government deficits, spiralling public debt, high and increasing unemployment and ailing
private firms. This led the then government to introduce a set of economic recovery policies
of which a 8,5% devaluation of the Belgian franc in 1982 was the most remarkable measure.
Potentially this led to the steep increase in growth rate dispersion during the 2nd half of the
80s. Depending on whether we include entry/exit activity, the decline in dispersion set in early
1990s (including exit/entry) or late 1990s (continuers only).
[Figure 2 about here.]
We can clearly confirm a continuing decline in growth rate dispersion over the past 2 decades.
This is in line with Decker et al. (2016) who see a sharp decline from the late 1980s to the early
1990s, a more modest decline in the second half of the 1990s followed by a sharp decline again
in the post-2000 period.
Recessions10 are also marked in Figure 2. We see little to no correlation between a period of
recession an a change in business dynamism. This confirms the decline in dynamism is a secular
trend rather than a phenomenon linked with the business cycle.
Figure 3 shows the same 90-10 dispersion in growth rate, but now for the balanced panel of
the 34,394 firms active throughout the 1985-2014 period.11 The trends initially shows a modest
decline which becomes more steep after 2000. A small decline is what can be expected as the
cohort ages. Fizaine (1968) already discovered that age has a negative impact on both the growth
8Analysis of continuing firms disregards entry and exit.
9Given the use of annual data, the Hodrick-Prescott smoothing parameter used is 100.
10A recession is defined as 2 subsequent quarters of negative quarter-on-quarter real GDP growth. Real GDP
growth figures from 1985 taken from the OECD.
1134,394 out of 91,488 firms active in 1985. The balanced panel represents 809,313 employees out of the total of
1,559,952 in 1985 and 718,519 FTE out of the total of 1,984,434 in 2014.
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and the variance of growth rates of French establishments. This has most recently been confirmed
by Bravo-Biosca (2016) who estimates that young firms grow about 3.5 times faster than older
firms based on data for several countries. Earlier, Haltiwanger et al. (2013) came to a similar
conclusion for the U.S. Nevertheless, the pace at which incumbent firms are becoming similar
growth-wise has increased throughout the period. This evolution cannot be seen independently
from the fact that according to Autor et al. (2017) the importance of larger corporations or so
called “superstar firms” for our economy has increased. More recently, De Loecker & Eeckhout
(2017) see the decrease of labour flows as a secular trend in the U.S. driven by the rise of firm
market power.12
[Figure 3 about here.]
In Figure 2 we saw a convergence in dispersion comparing all firms with continuing firms
only. This implies the impact of entry/exit on dispersion in growth rate has declined. Clearly
changes in entry/exit activity are not the sole drivers of the decline in dynamism. Both the
evolution of the continuing firms (i.e. excluding entry/exit in Figure 2,) and of the balanced
firm panel (Figure 3) confirm the secular trend of a decline in dynamism. Figure 4 now shows
the evolution of the annual firm entry (or start-up) rate as well as the exit rate. Figure 4a
gives the number of firms entering and exiting and Figure 4b shows these rates relative to the
total number of firms. The start-up rate experiences a strong declining trend. The number of
firms exiting goes up, though this changes looking at the employment destroyed by exiting firms
(Figures 4c and 4d). Studying employment at start-ups, we again find the same trend.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Figure 4 includes so called spurious entrants and exits. A spurious entrant is a newly
12See Appendices A and B that show that labour flows (job reallocation, creation and destruction) exhibit a
similar, declining trend as dispersion.
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established legal entity receiving a new business number,13 but which is not truly a new firm. A
spurious entrant is the result of a relocation of existing production factors from an incumbent,
either in total or partially, to a new business number. Geurts & Van Biesebroeck (2016) find,
based on detailed Belgian data of employee movements from the Belgian National Social Security
Office (NSSO), that more than one third of administrative start-ups with 5 to 9 employees and
two thirds with 10 or more employees are in fact spurious entrants. True entrants with more
than 50 employees are extremely rare. Unfortunately, detailed employee movements are not
available for the long time-period we study. To correct for spurious entrants and as a close
approximation of the underlying dynamics, we therefore remove all entrants with more than
10 employees.14 Figure 5 compares entry rate with and without spurious entrants. Based on
the numbers of firms entering (Figures 5a and 5b) there are only small changes as indeed few
firms enter with more than 10 employees. Looking, however, at the employment associated with
entry (Figures 5c and 5d) we see that entry is significantly reduced. Nevertheless; the overall
trend of declining start-up rates still holds. After 2000, the employment generated by start-ups
represents less than 0.5% of total employment and continues to decline.
[Figure 5 about here.]
The secular trend of declining Belgian business dynamism is not solely evident from the
measures we use here (growth rate dispersion, start-up rates). Decker et al. (2016) point to
numerous other studies based on U.S. data that find steady declines of other indicators as
well.15 Although not yet specifically studied, we have no reason to believe these trends for
U.S. business dynamism are not valid for a more rigid business environment such as Belgium.
13In Belgium a new business number is only given to a newly incorporated legal entity, with new shareholder
capital. A new business number is not given when there is a change of shareholder nor location.
14Geurts & Van Biesebroeck (2016) come to their findings based on entrants in the 2004-2012 period and we
assume the proportion of spurious entrants they find also holds for our time period 1985-2014.
15See e.g., Davis et al. (2010) for a declining pace of job flows and inflow rate into unemployment, Davis et al.
(2012) link this with a trend decline in excess worker reallocation. Hyatt & Spletzer (2013) find trend declines
in hiring, separations, job creation and destruction.
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Bellmann et al. (2017) find that the average level of hiring and separation indeed is much lower
in Germany than in the U.S., but the link between employment growth and worker flows in
Germany is very similar to the U.S.
Another interesting angle to look at the declining Belgian business dynamism is the presence
of mismatch. Bachmann et al. (2017) claim theories that explain job-to-job transitions by
productivity differences between firms are not fully consistent with the stylised facts they derive
for the German labour market. They revive Barlevy’s (2002) ideas that the level of mismatch
plays a more important role in driving the level of job-to-job transitions. This cannot be seen
independently of Zimmer (2012) who shows that Belgium has the highest level of job mismatch
in the EU-15 and this level has increased during the decade before 2010. Zimmer (2012) sees
the labour force’s educational level and/or location as the main obstacles to efficiently match
supply with demand.
Compositional shifts of the enterprise landscape can drive changes in dispersion. Geurts &
Van Biesebroeck (2016) find empirically that conditional on size, the growth rate of start-up
firms reduces with age and that, conditional on age, the growth rate increases with size. These
effects, however, disappear if firms of different ages are combined as older firms dominate the
larger size classes leading to negative growth-size relationship. This implies that the decline
in start-up rates and the rise of incumbent, “superstar firms” that shifts the age distribution
towards older firms, will have an impact on overall growth rate dispersion. Furthermore, Bijnens
& Konings (2017) show that over the past decades, Belgium has moved a large amount of jobs
from the capital intensive, goods producing manufacturing industry to more volatile distribution
and support services. Decker et al. (2016), however, find that compositional shifts (size, age,
industry) only account for a relatively small fraction of the overall decline in dispersion of U.S.
firm growth rates. In Appendix B we analyse the effect on compositional shifts on the decline
of Belgian job reallocation, creation and destruction rates and find that this only has a very
14
modest effect on the decline. Only 4% of the drop in job destruction rate can be attributed to
the changing composition of the Belgian firm landscape. For the change in job reallocation and
creation rate the changing composition actually has tempering effect of 2% to 9% of the rate.
We can hence conclude the changing composition is not the driver for the loss of dynamism and
this loss remains unexplained.
Figure 6a shows the trend in dispersion for different industries. The services industry repre-
sents approx. half of Belgian employment in the beginning of the period and gradually increases
its employment share to approx. 2/3 towards the end of period. Services predominantly take
share from the manufacturing industry. Dispersion in the manufacturing industry gradually
decreases. Dispersion in the services industry rises towards the end of the 90s, before declining
as well. While the Belgian services industry continues to grow in terms of value added and
employment, Van Beveren & Vanormelingen (2014) find that it actually had a negative within
firm productivity growth for the period 1998-2009 and that (very modest) productivity gains
are purely driven by between firm reallocation. The decrease in service industry dynamism must
hence be a source of concern. OECD (2017a) consistently urges Belgium to increase competi-
tion in the services industry to increase the potential for productivity growth. In Belgium, there
still is regulation in place protecting existing firms in the retail trade and professional services.
Although in the U.S. the services industry did contribute to aggregate productivity growth,16
Decker et al. (2016) also find declining dispersion for the U.S. services industries, albeit starting
from a significantly higher level compared to Belgium.
[Figure 6 about here.]
The high-tech sector is an important source of innovation and productivity growth. Figure
6b splits the manufacturing in high-tech and low-tech and the services industry in knowledge
16See e.g., Van Ark et al. (2008)
15
intensive (KIS) and less knowledge intensive services (LKIS).17 Overall, there are only limited
difference based on knowledge and technology intensity. High-tech manufacturing initially saw
increased dispersion, but started to decline as well from 2000. Knowledge intensive services
initially increased its dispersion vs. less knowledge intensive services, but towards the end of
the time period comes back to the same level.
Figure 7a shows the share of employment active at young firms18 and Figure 7b show this
employment share split between high-tech and low-tech sectors. Without taking spurious en-
trants into account, we see a decline in young firm employment from the early 90s. For the
high-tech manufacturing sector we see a steep drop already from the start of the studied period.
Figure 7c shows the dynamism of young firms clearly is significantly higher compared to the
dynamism of older firms. A remarkable finding is that dynamism at young firms has actually
been rising, but doesn’t result in an increase in aggregate dynamism since the share of young
firms simply drops. A possible explanation could be that it is predominantly start-up activity
from subsistence or lifestyle entrepreneurs that has been coming down.
[Figure 7 about here.]
Decker et al. (2016) come to the (preliminary) conclusion that the acceleration of the decline
in U.S. growth dispersion is driven by changes in high-tech and technology related firms and
potentially also by changes in publicly traded firms. We do not have specific data on Belgian
publicly traded firms,19 but we see a similar change in the pattern around the 2000. We do find,
however, preliminary evidence that the decline is driven by ICT intensive industries.
17(Medium) High-Tech and (Medium) Low-Tech Manufacturing industries and Knowledge Intensive Services
(KIS) and Less Knowledge Intensive Services (LKIS) as defined per 2-digit NACE code by Eurostat (2015) with
the exception of Employment Activities (NACE 78) that we, unlike Eurostat (2015), categorise as LKIS for
Belgium as the job creation is mainly driven by service voucher employment, a government scheme to subsidies
household help.
18Young firms are defined as max. 5y old
19The dataset would be very small as currently approx. 150 firms are listed on the Brussels stock exchange coming
down from approx. 400 publicly listed firms during the 1980s.
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5 High Growth Firms and Skewness
In this section, we examine the changing characteristics of high-growth firms and the skewness of
the growth size distribution in Belgium over the past 3 decades. Decker et al. (2016) describe the
current consensus on cross sectional patterns of business dynamics and firm growth in the U.S.20
Most findings have been confirmed for a broader set of OECD countries by Criscuolo et al. (2014)
and Calvino et al. (2015) and specifically for Belgium by Geurts & Van Biesebroeck (2016) and
emerge as stylised facts. Young firms disproportionately contribute to gross job creation and,
conditional on survival, show much higher growth rates than older firms. Probability of exiting
decreases linearly with age and the vast majority of start-ups do not grow at all. The positive
job growth contribution of young firms is driven by a small number of high-growth firms. These
patterns come together in the fact that young continuing firms show significantly higher skewness
in firm growth rates. The skewness and a change in skewness of the overall employment growth
distribution is hence closely linked with the activity of young, transformational entrepreneurs and
creative destruction. We first study the changes of the skewness of the firm growth distribution
is Subsection 5.1 and subsequently zoom into high-growth firms in Subsection 5.2.
5.1 The changing Nature of Skewness
We now examine the changing shape of distribution of firm growth rates over time. Figure 8
shows the difference between the 90th and the 50th percentile, the difference between the 50th
and the 10th percentile as well as the difference between the two. We expect the growth rate
distribution to be skewed to the right-hand side. This implies the 90-50 differential should be
bigger than the 50-10 differential. Figure 8a shows these differences for all firms. The 90-50
differential is indeed larger than the 50-10 differential though the difference clearly is declining.
This confirms Decker et al. (2016) finding for the U.S., though the differentials for the U.S.
20They base their findings predominantly on Haltiwanger et al. (2013) and Decker et al. (2016)
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are about 10pp higher than those for Belgium. The 50-10 differential is, since it is linked with
job destruction, counter-cyclical. The 90-50 differential is pro-cyclical implying job creation in
Belgium is highly linked with the business cycle as well. These 2 findings combined lead to the
fact that the difference between these 2 differentials is highly pro-cyclical. A striking finding is
that the volatility of the difference clearly is reducing with each recession, including the great
recession. The impact of a recession on the shape and skewness of the growth rate distribution
declines. Together with a declining dispersion, we can conclude Belgian firms are becoming
more homogenous with respect to employment growth rates. There is less reallocation and less
creative destruction and the impact of a recession is softening. Whether or not this phenomenon
is linked with the fact that there is a growing diversion between “superstar” or “frontier” and
the “rest” as described by Autor et al. (2017) for sales and Andrews et al. (2016) for productivity
remains to be investigated.
[Figure 8 about here.]
Figure 8b now shows the same differentials, but for continuing firms only (i.e. excluding
entry and exit). We see similar patterns. This means the decline in skewness is not purely
driven by an asymmetrical decline in entry and exit rates. The decline in the 90-50 differential
now only sets in from the 2000 recession which can be explained by the large entry rates of the
late 80s that are not taking into account anymore. This is the same finding as Decker et al.
(2016) who see an acceleration in decline of the skewness of the U.S. firm growth since 2000.
Remarkably, skewness for young firms as shown in Figure 8c does not come down and both
the 90-50 and the 50-10 differentials increase. This is contrary to the findings of Decker et
al. (2016) where both differentials decline for young firms. Young Belgian firms are becoming
less homogeneous from a growth point of view, but, as shown before, their share in the overall
employment declines. Older firms (Figure 8d) show little to no skewness. Skewness of mature
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firms remains fairly constant throughout the studied time period. The 90-50 differential is
significantly lower for older firms than for young firms. A young firm is more likely to experience
high growth than an older firm.
Combining the overall (declining) pattern for skewness with the (increasing) pattern for
young firms and the (stable) pattern for old firms, we can conclude the changes in skewness of
the firm growth rate distribution is driven by a shift of activity away from young to older firms.
[Figure 9 about here.]
Figure 9 shows the differentials for the 3 main broad sectors manufacturing, services and
construction. The pattern is similar to what Decker et al. (2016) find for the U.S., i.e. con-
vergence of the 90-50 and 50-10 differentials and an overall decline, especially since the end of
the 90s. The main sectors increasingly resemble each other with both skewness and dispersion
converging to each other.
[Figure 10 about here.]
Decker et al. (2016) find a change in the character of the changes in dispersion and skewness in
the U.S. firm growth rate distribution around 2000. Prior to 2000 changes where predominantly
driven by Retail Trade and Services (in our definition, these sectors are part of the less knowledge
intensive services industry). In the post-2000 period, changes are predominantly driven by
publicly traded firms and high-tech. Remarkably, we see a similar trend for Belgium. Figure
10 differentiates between high-tech manufacturing and knowledge intensive services on the one
hand and low-tech manufacturing and less knowledge intensive services on the other hand. Since
2000 the dispersion in high-tech manufacturing and KIS came down. Figure 10a shows this is
equally driven by a decline in the 90-50 differential and the 50-10 differential while for the low-
tech manufacturing sector (figure 10b), we see a continuous decline and no change around 2000.
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For KIS (figure 10c) we especially see a change in the 50-10 differential around 2000. Another
strong finding is the clear decline in pro-cyclicality of the skewness for KIS, predominantly
driven by the 90-50 differential. This is rather counterintuitive as in an advanced economy
that continuously switches jobs from manufacturing to services, we would expect an increasing
amount in dynamism for the knowledge intensive services industry. Although the overall pattern
for less knowledge intensive services is similar (figure 10d), we do not observe this steep decline
in pro-cyclicality.
5.2 The decline of High Growth Firms
We now turn to the evolution of high-growth firms (HGF). While it is often claimed that small,
young firms account for the majority of job creation, this is rebuked by Henrekson & Johansson
(2010). They analyse 20 empirical studies and find that a large share of net employment growth
is generated by a few rapidly growing firms, so-called High Growth Firms (HGFs). These HGFs
are not necessarily small and young, but it is predominantly young age more than small size
that seems to be linked with rapid growth and job creation. Geurts & Van Biesebroeck (2016)
find that firm size at start-up seems to have some predictive power for subsequent job creation.
HGFs thus play an important role in a dynamic economy as they represent a disproportionate
share of job creation. The OECD defines HGFs as “All enterprises with average annualized
growth greater than twenty percent per annum, over a three-year period, and with ten or more
employees at the beginning of the observation period.” Growth is measured by the number of
employees and by turnover. We will use compound annual employment growth rather than
average growth. This avoids a firm with yearly employee numbers of e.g., 10 (year 0), 5 (year 1),
10 (year 2) , 11 (year 3) is categorised as a HGF. Decker et al. (2016) follow the U.S. definition
of high growth and define all companies above the 90th percentile as HGF. As the median firm
shows little to no growth, what happens to the 90th percentile is closely linked with what happens
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to the 90-50 differential in firm growth rates. We will analyse high-growth firm activity based
on the European as well as the U.S. definition of high growth.
[Figure 11 about here.]
Figure 11 shows the growth rate of the 90th percentile of the employment growth rate dis-
tribution. We again observe a similar pattern studying all firms (Figure 11a), i.e. a change
in trend around 2000. Whereas prior to 2000 the growth rate of the 90th percentile is highly
volatile, in line with the business cycle and upward trending, post 2000 this volatility ebbs away.
The growth rate of the fastest growing firms declines. The overall trend masks the fact that
the growth rate of the fastest growing young firms is significantly higher and actually steadily
going up as shown in Figure 11b. High growth clearly is associated with younger firms. The
best young firms are actually doing well, but their impact on the overall trend completely fades
away since there is simply less activity from young firms.
Figure 11c compares the growth rate of the 90th percentile for services with that of KIS
and LKIS. We see the same pattern, an increase prior 2000 and a decrease post 2000. There is
little difference between knowledge intensive and less knowledge intensive services. Figure 11d
makes the distinction between high-tech and low-tech manufacturing. Low-tech manufacturing
experiences a gradual decline, while high-tech manufacturing initially sees an increase. Post
2000 there is a decline independent of technology level.
[Figure 12 about here.]
Figure 12 looks at high growth based on the Eurostat definition. Not surprisingly, the
same conclusion can be drawn. Figure 12a shows that he number of HGFs goes up until 2000
and comes down post-2000. If we look at the relative number of HGFs (Figure 12c), there is a
downward trend from the start of the studied period. Looking at employment from HGFs (Figure
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12b and Figure 12d), we come to a similar finding. Also for HGF employment, the volatility
stemming from the business cycle has significantly come down, with the latest downturn having
only a small impact on HGF activity.
Although HGFs play an important role in overall employment growth, the impact of the de-
cline in HGFs remains yet unknown. There is a clear decline in HGF activity and HGF activity
remains volatile, but we do not see a direct link with overall employment. Unemployment in
Belgium has remained fairly stable over the past decades and only experience mild fluctuations
in line with the business cycle. Possibly, HGF activity can be linked with the quality of em-
ployment. Bachmann et al. (2017) provide some intuition on this. They find in German data
that fast growing firms fuel their growth by poaching workers from other firms (rather than
hiring from unemployment). Most likely they need to offer better contract terms to do so. This
fuels overall salary growth. The decline of fast growing firms could hence offer a part of the
explanation that Belgian job creation at the higher paying levels is coming down as shown in
Bijnens & Konings (2017).
[Figure 13 about here.]
We now know that the decline in skewness and dispersion of the firm growth rate distribution
is driven to a large extend by what happens to the fastest growing firms.21 Looking at continuers
only, high growth firms increased their growth rates in the pre-2000 period. This drives the
overall 90-50 differential upwards. This was accompanied by a smaller increase of the 50-10
differential leading to an increase in dispersion and a small increase in skewness. Post-2000,
we see a drop in the 90-50 differential which brings down skewness and dispersion. It is hence
interesting to have a closer look at the fastest growing companies. To get a broader sample
as the approx. 1,000 companies p.a. that are categorised as high-growth firms according to
21Recall that this is also closely related to what happens to young firms as, conditional on size, young firms
experience faster growth than older firms.
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the Eurostat definition, we relax the requirements. We include companies with more than 10
employees experiencing 15% p.a.22 growth over a 3 year time frame. We not only include
the company at the 3rd year (when it reaches the high-growth status), but during the full 3
years leading to the high growth mark. Figure 13a shows the share of total employment these
companies represent split by firm size. Not surprisingly the smallest firms (as there are many)
and largest firms (as some are very large) represent the biggest share. The share of large firms
is volatile as this is driven by whether or not a small number of very large firms grow fast.
The share at the smallest fast growing firms is declining since 2000. If we now compare the
largest companies (500+ employees) with “the rest” (Figure 13b), a remarkable trend emerges.
Whilst post-2000 the largest fast growing companies are somewhat holding (and over the long
term even increasing) their share in overall employment, the smaller companies see their share
significantly drop. In other words, post-2000, sustained high growth is increasingly associated
with the largest companies.
Decker et al. (2016) predominantly see a decline in high-growth young firms, whereas we
find a decline in high-growth small firms. There is to a certain extend an overlap between these
two statements as young firms on average are smaller than older firms. Nevertheless Figure 13c
shows that the share of employment at young fast growing firms indeed declined since 2000.
The overall effect of this decline remains small though compared to the decline of fast growing
older small firms since 2000 pictured in Figure 13d. Furthermore, older, large firms seem to be
the only category that is able to show a somewhat increasing trend in its ability to become a
fast growing company.
22In stead of 20% p.a. as defined by Eurostat. 15% roughly corresponds with the 90 th percentile of the firm
growth rate distribution.
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6 Business Dynamism and ICT Intensity
We have so far shown that, similar to the U.S., there is a clear decline in business dynamism
and the trend changed towards the year 2000. The causes, however, remain yet unknown.
Since Belgium and the U.S., two very different economies, exhibit similar trends with respect to
dynamism, global changes affecting all countries are likely to have played a role. Possible causes
are the increasing use of ICT or participation of emerging economies in global supply chains. In
this chapter we briefly explore the impact of ICT.
Several authors already confirmed that a substantial part of the U.S. growth acceleration
from 1995 to 2000 is driven by the adoption of ICT (Jorgenson et al., 2002; Daveri, 2003).
Van Ark (2015) states this was also the case for Europe, though less outspoken compared to
the U.S. Van Reenen et al. (2010) link ICT with reallocation of employment and find firms with
higher levels of ICT are more likely to grow and less likely to exit.
The previous chapters already looked into potential differences driven by knowledge intensity
for services and by technology level for manufacturing. The industries are split according to the
definitions from Eurostat (2015) on the NACE 2-digit level. Figure 6b studied differences in
dispersion and Figure 10 looked at skewness. This split, however, yielded little further insights on
whether or not the knowledge or technology level of an industry has an impact on the evolution
of dynamism.
We now take a different approach to classify the different industries of our economy. We base
ourselves on the EU KLEMS Productivity and Growth Accounts on industry level for Belgium.23
The dataset provides us with the change in contribution of ICT capital services to value added
growth on an aggregation level between NACE 1-digit and 2-digit.24 We assume the industries
with the highest contribution between 2000 and 2014 are the ones that were most affected by the
23See Ja¨ger (2017) for an explanation of the EU KLEMS project and its data sources.
24Several 2-digit industries are taken together resulting in 29 different industries in stead of the 88 NACE 2-digit
industries.
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ICT revolution that set in during the second half of the ’90s.25 Companies in these sectors who
did not successfully invest in ICT, saw (compared to other industries) a disproportionate impact
on their value added growth and were hence more likely to stagnate or disappear. As acquiring
ICT knowledge and infrastructure is, to a certain extent, a fixed cost, smaller companies are
more likely to miss out on the ICT revolution which could ultimately result in a loss in business
dynamism as a limited number of successful companies become more dominant in an industry.
[Figure 14 about here.]
Figure 14a shows the evolution of dynamism (captured by the 90-10 differential of dispersion)
for ICT intensive vs. non-intensive industries. Both see an initial uptake in dynamism linked
with the increased start-up rate of the 2nd half of the 80s. Subsequently the non-ICT intensive
industries experience a slow, continuous decline throughout the studied period. ICT intensive
industries, however, show a strong increase in dynamism until the second half of the ’90s followed
by an even stronger decrease. The overall pattern of a change in dynamism in the late 90s is
clearly driven by the ICT intensive industries. This is not contradictory to Van Reenen et
al. (2010) who have shown that firms investing more in ICT grow more in employment. The
initial uptake of ICT will cause increased reallocation from firms not investing in ICT to firms
investing in ICT which initially leads to an increase of business dynamism. The ICT investing
firms will become larger and more productive and push the smaller, less productive firms out
of the market. The surviving firms become the “superstar firms” of their industries potentially
causing a subsequent decline in business dynamism.
One could argue that in Figure 14a, we do not observe the difference in ICT intensiveness,
25Via this methodology we categorise the following NACE sections or industries as ICT intensive (all other
industries, we regard as non-ICT intensive): IT and other information services (62-63), Telecommunications (61),
Publishing, audiovisual and broadcasting activities (58-60), Professional, scientific, technical administratieve and
support service activities (M-N), Financial and insurance activities (K), Wholesale and retail trade (G), Arts,
entertainment and recreation (R), Machinery and equipment n.e.c. (28), Chemicals and chemical products
(20-21), Coke and refined petroleum products (19), Electricity, gas and water supply (D-E).
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but rather a difference services vs. manufacturing as services are over represented in the ICT
intensive industries. Therefore, in Figure 14b we explicitly make the ICT intensiveness split for
manufacturing and services. Even within the services and the manufacturing industries, there is
a clear difference of the ICT intensive industries vis-a-vis the non-ICT intensive ones. For both
services and manufacturing, the ICT intensive industries exhibit the overall pattern of a change
in dynamism towards the end of the 90s, whilst the non-ICT intensive industries show a slower
decline and do not experience a trend change in the years leading to 2000.
Figures 14c and 14d now look at skewness of the employment growth rate distribution. Here
we come to a similar finding. The non-ICT intensive industries experience little to no change
in skewness. The ICT intensive ones experience a continued decline in skewness, predominantly
driven by a sharp decline of the 90-50 differential towards the end of the 90s.
We cannot claim (yet) the causes of the decline in business dynamism are linked with the
increased use of complex ICT systems during the second half of the ’90s. Nevertheless, we
find some preliminary indications that whether or not an industry has a high ICT intensity is
somehow linked with the decline in business dynamism. This topic needs further, more detailed
research.
7 Concluding Remarks
We find clear evidence that the secular decline in business dynamism is not limited to the U.S., a
highly entrepreneurial economy where dynamism started from a high base. Business dynamism
is declining in Belgium as well, an economy with a rigid labour market and where the levels of
entrepreneurship are significantly lower than in the U.S. We do not see a “revert to the mean” or
convergence with respect to business dynamism where highly dynamic economies are hampered
by increasing legislation and rigid economies become more entrepreneurial driven by structural
reforms.
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Similar to the U.S., we find a change in the characteristics of the evolution of business
dynamism in the period leading to the year 2000. Whereas for the U.S. the decline accelerated,
for Belgium the decline set in. These changes in Belgium and the U.S. happened around the
same time. Also similar to the U.S., the Belgian trend reverse towards the second half of the ’90s
is predominantly driven by a sustained decrease of the 90-50 differential of the firm growth rate
distribution. Although the causes of the change remain yet unknown, they are likely to be found
in global trends affecting (developed) economies in a similar way. Potential candidates could be
the increased use of ICT and its impact on productivity gains or the increased participation of
emerging economies in global supply chains.
The steep increase in globalisation of the past decades had indeed substantial effects on the
firm landscape. The Melitz (2003) model already implied only the best firms will participate in
the export market and will become better. Whether or not the increase in international trade
is related with the changes in dynamism is a topic for future research.
With respect to ICT as a cause for the decline in dynamism, we offer preliminary evidence
that the ICT intensiveness of an industry is linked with the gravity of the decline in business
dynamism. As our findings are based on a rather crude split of industries based on ICT inten-
siveness, this too, remains an area to further research.
We also see that the volatility of the 90-50 and 50-10 differentials is declining with each
business cycle. Firms are becoming less and less diverse from a growth rate perspective. Firms
increasingly resemble each other. Whether or not this goes hand in hand with decreasing
diversity in productivity in Belgium remains to be investigated. Andrews et al. (2016) already
showed dispersion in productivity within NACE 2-digit sectors is actually increasing.
One part of the explanation is that younger, more volatile, firms (although they show in-
creased levels of dynamism) represent a smaller share of the economy. This is a result of the
declining start-up rates. Another part of the explanation is the decline of high-growth firms.
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This drives the decrease of the 90-50 differential. High-growth firms are responsible for a dis-
proportionate share of overall job creation and productivity growth. While for the U.S., the
decline in high-growth firms is especially evident for young firms, we claim that the decline in
Belgian high-growth firms is predominantly driven by the decline of high-growth, small firms.
The propensity for large, older firms to become a high-growth firm seems to be trending upwards
while the propensity for a small firm to become a high-growth firm is rapidly declining since
2000.
Reallocation of (human) resources towards the most efficient and productive firms is an
important driver for overall productivity growth. The fact that larger firms seem to become
better at this compared to smaller firms might be due to the simple fact that they are more
productive. If this is the case, this trend is positive for overall productivity growth. Other
research indicates that younger firms on average invest more in innovation. If high growth is
more and more associated with larger firms this might also mean that they are more and more
able to shield themselves from creative destruction driven by younger and smaller firms. This
implies a negative effect on aggregate productivity. An alternative and less worrying explanation
could be that smaller, disruptive firms are more likely to be acquired by incumbent firms and
they continue their innovation supported by the resources and the management knowledge of
the incumbent. In any case, the research on the decline in business dynamism should not be
seen independently from the recent studies on the increased performance and power of the so
called “superstar firms”.
Another angle on the decline of business dynamism, especially relevant for Belgium, is the
increased presence of frictions. Frictions can slowdown the natural process of resources flowing
to the best and most productive firms. Belgium performs notoriously bad with respect to
the mismatch between labour supply and demand. Smaller firms might simply not have the
knowledge nor resources to successfully attract the necessary personnel to fuel their growth
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although they have an apparent demand for extra human resources. Understanding what caused
the Belgian decline in business dynamism and high-growth firm activity is a topic for future
research. This will be essential is also understanding their long term effects and mitigating a
potential negative impact.
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Figure 1: Examples of Employment Growth Rate Distributions
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Note: DHS growth refers to the growth rate defined by Decker, Haltiwanger and Shuh (1996). Author calculations
based on NBB database.
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Figure 2: 90-10 Differential in Firm Growth Rates
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Note: Grey shaded areas mark Belgian recessions. Authors calculations based on NBB database.
36
Figure 3: 90-10 Differential in Firm Growth Rates for Firms active throughout 1985-2014
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Source: NBB, Author's calculations
Note: Grey shaded areas mark Belgian recessions. Authors calculations based on NBB database.
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Figure 4: Evolution of annual Entry and Exit Rates
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Note: Grey shaded areas mark Belgian recessions. Authors calculations based on NBB database.
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Figure 5: Firm Entry Rates with and without Spurious Entrants
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Note: Spurious entrants defined as entrants with more than 10 employees. Author calculations from NBB
database.
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Figure 6: 90-10 Differential in Firm Growth Rates for selected Industries
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Agriculture Construction Services
Manufacturing Utilities
(a) Split between main sectors of the economy
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
High-Tech Low-Tech
KIS LKIS
(b) Split based on technology level
Note: Dispersion figures based on HP filter. Sectors defined according to NACE Rev. 2 (2008). Technology level
and knowledge intensity according to Eurostat. Author calculations based on NBB database.
40
Figure 7: Share of Employment 90-10 Differentials at young Firms
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Figure 8: 90-50 and 50-10 Differentials
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Note: Grey shaded areas mark Belgian recessions. Authors calculations based on NBB database.
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Figure 9: 90-50 and 50-10 Differentials per Sector
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Figure 10: 90-50 and 50-10 Differentials, Technology and Knowledge Intensity
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Figure 11: P90, Overall, Services & Manufacturing (Continuing Firms only)
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Figure 12: High Growth Firms (Eurostat Definition)
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Figure 13: Share of Employment at Fast Growing Companies by Firm Size and Age
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Author calculations from NBB database.
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Figure 14: The Impact of ICT on Business Dynamism and Skewness
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A Alternative Measures of Business Dynamism
Similar to Decker et al. (2016) we conduct robustness analysis and calculate different measures of
business dynamism. A first measure is the total job reallocation rate, i.e. the sum of job creation
and destruction. This can be seen as an indication of the level of job reallocation between firms.
A second measure is the cross sectional standard deviation of the firm employment growth rates26
as an indicator for the dispersion of the distribution. Finally we also calculate the within-firm
volatility of employment weighted growth rates within a 10 year horizon as developed in Davis
et al. (2007).
[Figure A.1 about here.]
Figure A.1 shows the different measures. We clearly observe that also these measures point
to a clear decline of business dynamism over the past decades. The job reallocation rate (A.1a)
initially goes up and clearly comes down after the mid 90s. The standard deviation of the
employment growth rate distribution (A.1b) continuously declines for both the unweighted and
the employment weighted distribution. The within-firm volatility given in A.1c remarkable
declines as well. Finally, A.1d also gives the within-firm volatility for the balanced panel of
firms that are continuously active in the studied period. This measure is hence filtered of all
entry and exit activity and shows a systematic decline as well.
B The Role of Compositional Shifts
In this Section we quantify the contribution of compositional shifts to the change in business
dynamism.Bijnens & Konings (2017) described the significant shift in the structure of the Bel-
gian firms landscape throughout the previous decades: jobs flow rom the manufacturing to the
services industry, from smaller to larger and from younger to older firms. It could well be that
26Firm growth rate (DHS growth) as used in the main body of this paper and defined in Davis et al. (1998)
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the change in overall dynamism is not driven by an intrinsic change in dynamism of a certain
type of firms, but driven by the fact that jobs are shifted towards less dynamics parts of our
economy without these parts becoming less dynamic per se.
In Figure A.2 we further clarify this concept. Figure A.2a shows the total job reallocation
rate as well as this rate for the services and the manufacturing industry. Clearly the services
industry’s reallocation rate is significantly higher than the one for the manufacturing industry.
A shift of jobs to the more dynamic services industry would hence increase the overall dynamism
of the economy. This shift works in the opposite direction compared to the overall decline in
dynamism our economy has experienced. Figure A.2b looks at the different reallocation rates
of firms based on age. Here younger firms have a reallocation rate that lies substantially above
the rate of older firms. As discussed in the main body of this paper, firm size is linked with firm
age. Figure A.2c gives the job reallocation rate split by different size categories. Based on these
graphs, we can easily conclude that a shift of jobs away from smaller, younger firms towards
bigger and older firms will have a negative impact on the reallocation rate. The questions
remains, however, how big this impact is.
[Figure A.2 about here.]
We again follow Decker et al. (2016) and conduct a simple shift share decomposition analysis
of the job reallocation rate. We allocate all firms to different cells defined by 88 NACE 2-digit
industries, 8 firm age groups (0y to 5y, 6y-10y, and 10+y) and 8 firm size groups based on
number of employees (1-9, 10-19, 20-49, 50-99, 100-249, 250-499, 500-999 and 1000+). We focus
on the change in job flows, more specifically the overall change and the within cell component of
the decomposition. The within cell component yields the change in the overall flow rate if every
cell would have kept the same level of employment. The difference between these 2 indicate
to what extend compositional changes drive the overall change as opposed to the within cell
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changes. We do this for the change in job reallocation, creation and destruction rates between
the extreme values before the technology crisis of 2000 and the financial crisis of 2008. We use
a 3 year moving average to minimise the impact of short term variations.
Table A.1: Role of Compositional Shifts on Change in Job Reallocation, Creation & Destruction Rate
Job Reallocation Job Creation Job Destruction
Overall Δ 1998-2007 -2.66 pp -1.25 pp -1.41 pp
Impact of changing composition of businesses:
w Only Sector 0.48 pp -18% 0.69 pp -56% -0.21 pp 15%
Only Age -0.52 pp 19% -0.41 pp 33% -0.10 pp 7%
Only Size 0.23 pp -9% 0.07 pp -6% 0.16 pp -11%
Sector, Age & Size Combined 0.05 pp -2% 0.11 pp -9% -0.06 pp 4%
Note: Δ 1998-2010 represents the change in percentage points of the 3y moving average of the
studied flow (job reallocation, creation and destruction rate) between 1998 and 2007. The
impact of the changing composition is calculated as the difference between de actual change
of the flow rate and the within cell component of this change. The cells are defined based on
sector, age and size individually and sector, age and size combined. Author calculations from
firm annual accounts.
Table A.1 summarises the result. We see that the job reallocation rate dropped with 2.66
percentage points between its peak in 1998 and the bottom in 2007. The impact of the shift
between sectors (i.e. mainly the shift from manufacturing to services industries) is 0.48 per-
centage points positive. This means that the drop in reallocation rate would have actually been
18% higher if jobs weren’t shifted between sectors. This is in line with the intuition from the
graphs from Figure A.2. Similarly, shifts between firm sizes have a positive, though smaller
impact on the flow rates. Firm age is an important factor and actually the only factor that has
a consistent negative impact on the studied flow rates. 19% of the drop in job reallocation rate
and even 33% of the drop in job creation rate can be attributed to shift of jobs towards older,
less dynamic firms. This is consistent with the findings in the main body of this paper, that the
loss in business dynamism in linked with the decreased activity of younger firms.
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The structural shifts in our economy actually work in opposite directions. Whilst shifts
between sectors and firms sizes lower the drop in reallocation rate, shifts between firms with
different ages increase the drop in reallocation rate. This leads to the fact that the combined
effects cancel out and actually is very modest. Only 4% of the drop in job destruction rate can
be attributed to the changing composition of the Belgian firm landscape. For the change in job
reallocation and creation rate the changing composition in fact has a tempering effect of 2% to
9% of the rate. We can hence conclude the changing composition is not the driver for the loss
of dynamism and this loss remains largely unexplained.
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Figure A.1: Evolution of Different Measures for Business Dynamism
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Note: Grey shaded areas mark Belgian recessions. Authors calculations based on NBB database.
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Figure A.2: Evolution of the Between Firm Job Reallocation Rate (as % of total employment)
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